Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax by Kramer, Gerald H. & Snyder, James M., Jr.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
FAIRNESS, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE POLITICS OF THE PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX 
Gerald H. Kramer 
James M. Snyder 
\�c,1\lUTE Of: 
�� 
r�r: 
� � � 0 
;; co 
l.J 
� 
. < 
"""' 
. 
� ft; 
� 
� 
l-1; � � '" SflALL tAP...�S:. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 498
November 1983 
ABSTRACT 
FAIHNESS, SELF -INTEREST, AND THE POLITICS OF THE PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX 
GeraJ.d H. Kramer and James M. Snyder 
All advanced democracies have adopted income taxes with 
considerable progression in marginal tax rates . To explain this we 
examine the nature of individual and collective preferences over 
alternative tax schedules, in the context of a simple two-sector model . We 
first consider the case of altruistic or "sociotropic" citi zens who 
view the income tax as a means of achieving a fairer or more 
e galitarian distribution of income . We show that greater marginal-rate 
progressivity may well be less fair; that a "f i!i.irest" tax, however 
defined, is always a linear or "flat-rate" schedule in which all 
incomes are taxed at the same marginal rate ;  and that with a purely 
sociotropic electorate there exists a flat-rate schedule which is a 
majority equilibrium. We then show that with "self-interested" voters 
who seek to mi nimize their own tax burdens, greater marginal-rate 
progression may well be preferred by middle- and upper -income voters; 
that for middle-income citi zens the optimal schedule is a sharply 
progressive one ; and that within the set of individually optimal 
schedules there exists a majority e quilibrium, which is a progressive 
schedule which minimizes the burden on median-income or middle class 
citizens, at the expense of l ower- and upper -income taxpayers. 
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1 • INTRODUCTION 
Distributional issues are the most divisive and potenti ally 
destabilizing a democratic society can face , and clearly the taxation 
of incomes is the most direct and transparent, and hence potentially 
most explosive, redistributive mechanism. 
Yet in practice the potential instabilities do not seem to 
arise often. A high ly stylized but broadly accurate summary of the 
salient facts might run as foll ows : All advanced industri al 
democracies impose direct taxes on incomes, and the income tax 
typically serves redistributive as well as revenue -raisi ng ends . The 
incidence of the tax burden seems quite stable over time ; while income 
tax schedules are revised from time to time, the changes are typically 
rather modest and incremental (e . g. readjusting brackets for 
inflation), and hardly of the chaotic and large -scale kind we might 
expect if the political process underlying the changes were driven by 
majority coalitions of "have-nots" getting together to tax away the 
incomes of the minority of "haves . "  The effective (as distinct from 
2 
statutory) incidence across income classes is e ven more stable. 
Income tax paid as a fraction of before-tax income typically increases 
somewhat with income. The average effecti ve tax rate is t hus mildly 
progressive, and achieves some redistribution of incomes. The degree 
of redistribution is quite modest, however, and falls far short of 
complete equalization of after-tax income. 
At the s ame time, however, statutory marginal rates increase 
more rapidly with income, in many cases dr amatically: in Australia, 
Belgium and France ,  for example, the marginal tax rate on taxable 
(declared) income varies from zero in the lowest tax bracket to 60'Wi or 
• 
more in the highest bracket . Statutory marginal rates show 
considerable progression in all the advanced industrial democracies, 
with maximum rates ranging from 3 9.6% in Denmark to a high of 83 % in 
Great Britain. The extreme rates are to some degree misleading, of 
course, since often they apply to only a minuscule portion of the 
taxpaying population. A better idea of the effective progression of 
rates can be obtained from Table 1, which shows the statutory marginal 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
rates for taxpayers at the tenth, fiftieth and ninetieth percentiles 
of the before-tax income distribution, for various countries. The 
countries are grouped, somewhat subjectively, according to the degree 
• Data from OECD (1981), for central go vernment income tax
schedules in effect duri ng the mid -se venties. Inter-country 
comparisons are sub ject to the usual caveats concerni ng differi ng 
definitions of taxable income, joint versus individual taxation, 
the role of social security contributions and local income taxes,
and so forth. 
and nature of marginal -rate progressivity. In Australia and Great 
Britain the marginal rate is constant across all incomes in this 
range; despite t he nominal progressivity of their tax sc hedules (from 
0 to 61.S'Ki in Australia, 3 4% to 83 % in Great Britain), the income tax 
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in these countries is, effecti vely, a linear or flat-rate tax for most 
of the population. In Austria, Germany, and Denmark the marginal rate 
is constant across low and middle incomes, but then s hows some 
progression in the upper -income range. In t he next group of countries 
there is some modest increase in rates over the l ower half of the 
distribution, but most of the progression again occurs at higher 
income levels. The progression in rates extends down t hrough all 
income levels in Norway and Sweden, and in the last two countries, 
Ireland and Belgium, the increase is actually greater over the lower 
half of the income distribution. The tax schedules chosen by 
different countries thus vary considerably. All , however, seem 
committed to some degree of progression; with only one apparently 
• 
inadvertant exception, marginal rates always increase, and ne ver 
decrease, with income. 
• In Belgium, because of a ceiling on the income tax surcharge t he 
effecti ve marginal rate decreases slightly in the highest 
bracket. 
• • • 
It seems natural enough to suppose that in a democracy the 
choice of a tax schedule shoul d reflect the preferences of the 
citi zenry, and should be compatible with majority rule. But how well 
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can theory account for these empirical facts, and explain the observed 
democratic preference for progressive taxation? 
There have been a few relevant studies . A common fr amework is 
as foll ows : an income tax schedule must be chosen by majority voti ng 
over some set of admissable schedules. If the ith individual ' s  
befor e-tax income i s  Yi' his tax burden under the schedule T is T (Yi ),
and his after -tax consumption or disposable income is yi =Yi - T (Yi ). 
His average tax rate is thus T (Yi)/Yi ' while his marginal rate is
dT (Yi) t (Yi) = �· An admissable schedule must raise enough revenue to 
meet a fixed, exogenously given revenue target, R = �T (Yi), and must 
typically satisfy certain "fairness" constraints as well (e.g. 
T (Y) i Y,  0 i t (Y) i 1,  perhaps ddi) 2 0).
In Foley ' s  (1967) analysis, befor e-tax incomes are taken as 
exogenous and independent of the tax schedule chosen, and citizens are 
assumed to be egoistically motivated and strive to maximi ze their own 
disposable incomes in choosing among schedules . In Foley ' s  main 
result the admissable cl ass is further restricted to the class of 
linear or "flat-rate" schedules of the form T(Y) = a. + j:IY, where ti is 
the constant marginal tax rate, and a. is a lump -sum tax payment (if 
a. > 0) or credit (if a. < 0). (In the latter, "negative income tax" 
s 
case the average rate T (Y)/Y increases in Y, so the schedule woul d be 
progressive in the average (but not marginal) sense.) Foley shows that 
under these assumptions majority voting yields a transitive ordering 
of the set of admissable schedules, so an e quilibrium outcome exists. 
If incomes are distributed in the usual left-skewed fashion, however, 
the equilibrium is at 13 = 1, and thus results in complete equalization 
of after-tax incomes � an empirically implausible result. 
One unrealistic assumption underlying this result is that 
incomes are exogenous , so that even extensive redistributions do not 
affect the size of the pie. R omer (1975) has analyzed a more 
realistic model in which citi zens can respond to high t� rates by 
substituti ng untaxable leisure for taxable work effort. Again, the 
admissable schedules are assumed to be linear, and voting is 
"egoistic," with each voter trying to maximize a Cobb -Douglas utility 
function which depends solely on "own" after -tax income, and leisure. 
R omer shows that when the range of the admissable tax rates is 
restricted to those at which all citi zens would continue to work 
(rather than choose to be voluntarily unemployed and live off their 
tax cre dit), voter preferences over tax rates are single-peaked, so 
majority rule is transitive and there again exists an equilibrium. 
Unlike Foley ' s  this is typically an interior equilibrium which lies 
between the extremes of complete redistribution or none at all, a more 
plausible result .  However when the restrictions (which relate to the 
underlying parameters of the model) are relaxe d, an e quilibrium need 
not exist. Moreover even when there is an equilibrium, it may (again 
depending on the underlying parameters) be at a > O, and thus be a 
regressive one . Since the results are sensitive to the precise 
specification and parameter values of the model, it would presumably 
require careful econometric investigation to see how well this model 
can account for our various stylized facts .  
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It seems quite clear, however, that neither it nor the Foley 
model can expl ain the prevalence of increasi ng-rate schedules. As 
Foley shows , once nonlinear tax schedules which allow for the 
possibility of varying marginal rates are introduced into the feasible 
set, voting cycles become inevitable, and no majority equilibrium 
exists; the s ame will clearly also be true in the R omer structure. 
Since nonlinear schedules with increasing marginal rates are clearly 
admissable members of the political agendas of all advanced industrial 
democracies, self-interested voting would lead to gross instability 
and cycling over tax structures, with new majority coalitions 
perpetually emerging and overturning the existing tax code in favor of 
a new one which favors them. This picture of perpetual chaos is 
hardly plausible empirically. 
An alternative possibility is that citi zens view the income 
distribution as a pure public good (Thurow (1971)), and that their 
preferences over redistributive tax schedules are primarily 
reflections of their views on fairness and social justice. The 
implications of this approach for majority voting have been explored 
by Hamada (1973 ). Again, before-tax incomes are taken to be exogenous 
and independent of taxes . The voter in question, j, assumes that all 
7 
citi zens share a common utility or welfare function, Uj, strictly 
concave in income, but differ in their incomes. Thus if citizen i bas 
an after-tax income of yi' his welfare (in j ' s  view) is U
j(yi). Each 
citi zen j has an essenti ally Benthamite social welfare function, in 
which social welfare is simply the sum of individual welfare levels; 
thus citizen j, when judging two tax schedules T ,  T' which yield 
post -tax income distributions y and y '  respectively, will prefer T to 
T '  if and only if 
�Uj(yi) > �Uj(yi ' ) .
Since different citizens may have different social welfare functions 
it is not self-evident as to whether majority voti ng over some set of 
schedules is well-behaved. 
It turns out there is a majority equilibrium under this 
structure; it is, however, identical to Foley ' s ,  and results in 
complete equalization of after-tax incomes. In one respect the 
public-goods equilibrium is more robust , since Hamada places no 
restrictions on the form of admissable schedules (the Foley result 
depends heavily on their linearity). On the other hand Hamada also 
shows, in his major result, that in general there will be majority 
cycles over the non-equilibrium schedules. Thus the equilibrium is 
not a stable one, and there is no guarantee that successive majority 
votes over arbitrary changes in the tax code would necessarily 
converge on it. The more fundamental problem, however, is that the 
public goods e quilibrium is implausibly egalitarian. 
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The incorporation of incentive effects could possibly lead to 
more plausible results. We know of no attempt to do this directly; 
some results in the optimal taxation lit erature. however, are at least 
suggestive, since the optimal taxation problem is closely akin in 
structure to the choice problem confronting a representati ve 
"Benthamite" voter in the Hamada framewor k. Shesenski's (1972) 
analysis of optimal linear taxation suggests t hat within the class o f  
linear schedules .  our representati ve (or median) voter would prefer a 
progressive schedule with m > 0, R omer ( 1976) has pointed out,
however, that this result rests on some rather special assumptions; 
moreover . because o f  pervasive nonconvexities which arise from the 
structure of the problem. it appears most unlikely that si ngle­
peakedness would hold except in special and atypical cases, so e ven 
within t he class o f  linear tax schedules, the existence of a voti ng 
equilibrium (progressive or not). is problematical in the Hamada 
framewor k, once incentive effects are allowed for. 
With nonlinear, increasing-rate sc hedules equilibrium is o f  
course e ven less likely. Moreover other results in t he optimal 
taxation literature suggest that our Benthamite. soci al-welfare­
oriented voter. given a free choice on t he form of the tax schedule, 
might well prefer one which is approximately linear (e.g •• section 9 
of Mirr Lees (1971) ) ,  or even one in which the margi nal tax rate 
diminishes with income (Theorem 4 of Sadka (1976) ) ,  The apparently 
stable democratic preference for increasi ng-rate sc hedu les therefore 
remains rather mysterious , in light o f  these results. 
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• • • 
In this paper we explore t he issues o f  indi vidual and 
co llective choice of an income tax schedule in t he context o f  a simple 
model which incorporates incentive effects which are si milar in 
spirit, but di fferent in detail, fr om those of the R omer and optimal 
taxation variety. We assume, conventionally, that individuals vary in 
t heir potenti al income-earni ng abilities. However in our model an 
individual faced with a high tax rate on his labor income responds , 
not by substituting untaxable leisure for taxable work effort, but 
rather by wor king in an untaxed "unaergroundn economy. at a lower (but 
tax-free) wage rate. Individual welfare is measured by total (taxable 
and underground) after-tax income; the "fairness" of any tax thus 
depends direct ly on the after-tax income distribution it induces 
(rather than of the essentially unidenti fiable cardinal utilities 
which play a centr al role in the optimal taxation literature). 
In part 2 of the paper we describe the mode l and develop some 
necessary preliminary machinery and results; the reader uninterested 
in techi nical details may wish to concentrate on sections 2 .1 and 2 .4. 
which contain the essential results for the subsequent argument , and 
skim sections 2.2 and 2.3. In part 3 we examine the relationship 
between fairness and t he form of the tax sc hedule. We fi rst show 
(Proposition 3.4) that for any progressive schedule T we can always 
find a less progressive schedule T' which is fairer according to � 
fairness criteria; thus the relationship between fairness and 
marginal-rate progressivity is not necessarily positive, and may well 
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be a perverse one. We then consi der the choi ce of a fair tax s chedule 
from the point of an individual decision-maker (a be nevolent despot, 
an elected representative, or a "so ciotropic" citi zen-voter who views 
distributional issues in public-goods terms). In Proposition 3 .6 we 
show that any such individual will always choose a linear or "flat­
rate" s chedule. no matter what parti cular fairness criterion be 
employs (though of course the parameters of the optimal linear 
schedule will depend on the criterion); a progressive schedule is 
never optimal (or "fairest") under any measure of fairness. We then 
turn to the issue of collective choi ce of a tax s chedule by majority 
rule. In Proposition 3 .8 we show that with sociotropic voters who 
judge tax proposals accordi ng to their fairness (variously measured), 
there necessarily exists a majority equilibrium. The equilibri um 
s chedule is, once again, a linear one . 
The fact that there exists a stable or equilibrium tax 
s chedule is a step in the right direction; however the fact that the 
equilibrium is not progressive leaves unexpl ained the pervasive and 
apparently stable democrati c preference for increasi ng-rate schedules. 
We thus turn elsewhere for an explanation. and in Part 4 examine the 
choi ce of a tax s chedule from the viewpoint of a selfish or "egoistic" 
citi zen-taxpayer, who is interested only in maximizing his welfare, 
rather than promoting social justice or distributional fairness. In 
Proposition 4 .1 we show that a majority of such citizen-taxpa yers,
consisting of those in the middl e- and upper -income ranges, may indeed 
prefer more progressivity in income taxation. This preference has 
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nothing to do with fairness � the more-progressive tax s chedule they 
prefer over the status quo is unambiguousl y � f air � but rather 
arises from the fact that greater progression in marginal rates can 
actually reduce the tax burden on middl e- and upper -income taxpayers, 
at the expense of the poor. In Proposition 4.2 . we show that a 
"selfish" citizen-taxpayer interested in minimizing his own tax 
burden. and given a free choi ce on the form of the s chedule, would 
choose a sharpl y progressive one , which imposes a low (in fact. zero ) 
marginal rate on l ower incomes ,  and high rates on large incomes. 
Individual pref erences over different s chedules of this form of course 
vary, since the parameters of the individually optimal schedule depend 
on the individual's own position in the income (or ability) 
distribution; in Proposition 4.3. however, we show that there 
nevertheless e xists a majority equilibrium within the set of such 
schedules. The equilibrium is the most-preferred s chedule of the 
median-income� i.e •• typi cal middle-cl ass� taxpayer. 
Our results thus suggests that the observed stability and 
progressivity of income taxation in democrati c societies has little to 
do with fairness or equity considerations , but rather arises from the 
success of the middle class in minimizing its own tax burden, at the 
expense of upper- and l ow-income taxpayers. This conclusion is, of 
course, quite reminiscent of Director 's Law of Income Redistribution 
(Stigler ( 1970) ) .
2 . PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
2 .1 The Model 
We assume that individuals vary in their ability to earn 
incomes and that this ability, a composite of intrinsic intellectual 
and physical capacity, work ethic and energy. education, skills and 
training. and the like. is indexed by a single number n. The 
distribution of ability in the population is described by a 
distribution F. which we assume to have a continuous density f ;;; �· 
The ability index is normalized to lie between zero and one for all 
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individuals in the population, and we assume there are at least a few 
individuals of every ability level in this range (i.e. f(n) > O for 
1 
all n a (0,1)). The total (or mean) ability level is ii a fn•dF(n) .
0 
Individuals are worker-consumers in a simple one-good economy 
with two production sectors. a "legal". taxable sector, and an 
"underground". untaxable sector . We can think of an individual of 
ability n as possessing n units of standardized labor. which he can 
allocate as he chooses between the two sectors . We again normalize so 
that the wage rate in the taxable sector is always unity . Thus, if an 
individual of ability n chooses to work entirely in the taxable sector 
he can earn a pretax. taxable income of I = n. Conversely, if he 
works entirely in the untaxable sector his (untaxable) income is z = w 
• n. where w is the prevailing wage rate in the underground economy;
and if he works ln units in the latter and n - ln units in the former.
his total pretax income is Y = X + z = (n - ln) + w0ln. If he is
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taxed T(X )  on his taxable (declared) income. his after-tax taxable 
income is x = X - T(X ) .  while his total after-tax income is y = x + z.  
The wage rate in the untaxed sector in general depends on the 
total labor supply L to that sector . We assume the wage schedule w(L) 
(or inverse labor demand function) is a strictly decreasing. twice-
continuously differentiable function, with w(O) i 1 (otherwise 
individuals would work in the untaxed sector irrespective of tax 
considerations) ,  and w(n) > o. 
A ta:x; schedule is a function T which specifies for any level 
of (taxable) income X the amount of tax T(X )  to be paid. Taxable 
incomes necessarily lie between zero and one, and for the schedules of 
interest below we can without loss of generality suppose that tax 
liabilities or credits also lie in this interval; hence a tax schedule 
is a function defined on this domain and range. i.e. 
T: [0.1] � [-1 .+1] . We shall confine attention to schedules which 
are continuous, and continuously differentiable except possibly at 
some finite number of income levels which define different "tax 
brackets . •  Thus for any T the marginal-rate schedule t = � is defined
except possibly at some finite number of points (and continuous 
wherever defined) . An admissable schedule is one which is an 
increasing function of income, and whose marginal rate does not exceed 
1 (i .e .  t (X )  a [0,1] for all I at which t (X )  is defined) , and which is 
not regressive in the sense that the marginal rate is also an 
increasing function of income (i.e. t(X ' )  2 t (I)  if I ' > I ).  (It 
would also be natural to require T (I)  i x i.e .  that tax liahilities 
not exceed taxable income. As shown in Section 2.4 below, however. 
this constraint is automatically satisfied by feasible schedules. so 
we do not impose it explicitly, ) 
Some descriptive terms for different kinda ot schedules will 
be useful . A linear or flat-rate schedule is one of the forin 
T(X) = a + px. whose marginal rate t (X )  = p is constant for all 
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incomes. A progressive schedule T is one whose marginal-rate schedule 
t is strictly increasing over some range of incomes. or equivalently 
t (O) < t (l) . One schedule T is more progressive than another, T '  (or 
equivalently, T' is less progressive than T) if the marginal-rate 
schedule t crosses t' from below; i.e. if there is some income level 
x• such that t(X )  i t ' (X )  for X < x• and t (X) i t ' (X) for X > x•. with 
strict inequalities holding on I - {X*J for some open interval I which
•contains I • 
A feasible schedule is one which raises just enough revenue to 
meet an exogenously given revenue target. Since we are interested in 
redistributional issues. we shall suppose that the target is zero, so 
that the income taxation is purely redistributional. Thus, if we 
denote by RT the total tax collected under the admisaable schedule T, 
then T is feasible if and only if RT = o. 
We now examine some consequences of these definitions and 
assumptions. 
2 .2 Individual Labor Supply 
Let the tax schedule T and wage rate w be fixed. If an 
individual of type n works ln units in the untaxed sector and (n - Ln>
1S 
in the taxable sector (where O i ln in) , his after-tax consumption is
y = X - T(X )  + z = (n - fn) - T(n - {n) + win' His problem is to
maximize this quantity with respect to ln.
Let us suppose. initially. that the schedule T is continuously 
differentiable and that the marginal rate t is strictly increasing on 
ro.11 . Then. differentiating with respect to 'n· we have 
dyn dl = w - Cl - t (n - ln) ] .  and since t is increasing the maximizingn 
A 
value ln will be as :(ollows:
(2.la) A If w > 1 - t(O) then ln = n for all n.
(2.lb) A If w < 1 - t(l) then ln = O for all n.
(2.lc) A If w s (1 - t(l) ,1 - t(O) ] and w < 1 - t(n) , then ln = O • 
A 
(2.ld) If w s (1 - t(l) ,1 - t (O) ] and w � 1 - t (n) then ln must
satisfy w = 1 - t (n - ? ). n 
Note that. since t is strictly increasing, there will be a 
unique ?n satisfying (2 .ld) . Hence all individuals of type n choose
A 
the same ln• which can be expressed as a labor supply function
A 
lTCn:w) . For w s (1 - t (l) ,1 - t(O) ] define °f(W) as the unique
(since (1 - t(' ) ]  is continuous and strictly decreasing on this 
interval) ability level for which 1 - t(°f (w) ) = w. and let °f Cw) = 1
for w < 1 - t(l) and °f (W) = O tor w > 1 - t(O) . Evidently °T C
') is a
continuous , decreasing function of w. and is strictly decreasing on 
(1-t(l) ,1-t(O) ) .  The individual labor supply function can then be 
16 
explicitly characterized as follows : 
(2.2) 
A 
LT(n;w) 
using (2.1) above. 
0 
n - °f (W) 
if n i nT(w)
if n 2. °f(W)
The relationship between these various quantities can be seen 
on Figure 2 .1 below. An individual with taxable income equal to 
FIGURE 2 .1 ABOUT HERE 
°f(W) faces a marginal rate t(°T (w) ) equal to 1 - w. Any individual 
with n < °f (W) faces a lower marginal rate even if he works entirely 
in the taxable sector. so ?n = o. and his untaxable income zT(n) is
A 
zero. while his taxable income XT (n) is n - Ln = n. An individual for
whom n 2. °r(w) will work only °r(w) hours in the untaxable sector .
Hence taxable income Xr <n> = LT(n) = °r(w) is constant for all n 2. °r•
while untaxable income zT(n) = w 
• ?n = w(n - °f (w) ) increases with n. 
at rate w. Total pretax income YT (n) = XT(n) + zT(n) thus increases
with n. with slope 1 for n i nT (w) . and with slope w thereafter. 
2.3 Equilibrium 
A 
The individual labor supply function LT yields a total labor1 
A J "" supply of LT (w) • LT(n;w)dF (n) to the untaxed sector . A wage rate
0 
w0 is an equilibrium if it clears the labor market. i.e.  if 
A w(LT<w0>> = w0 • We now show that such an equilibrium wage necessarily
I 
exists. and is unique . 
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As noted earlier. the wage in the untaxed sector is a strictly 
decreasing function of the aggregate labor supplied to that sector . 
Since 1 - t is also decreasing on [0 ,1] , w(O) i 1 - t(l) implies 
w(L) < 1 - t(O) for any L. so from (2.lb) everyone will work only in 
the taxable sector. and w0 = w(O) at the unique equilibrium in this 
case. 
Similarly. from (2.la) . w<ii> 2. 1 - t (O) implies L0 = 1 and
hence that w0 = w(n) is the unique equilibrium. 
The remaining possibility is w (O) > 1 - t (l) . w<ii> < 1 - t(O) . 
Let us suppose. initially. that T is continuously differentiable and t 
is strictly increasing everywhere. Define the function 
1 
N :  co.11 � co.n] by N(n ' )  = J (n - n ' ) dF (n) . Then
1 n'  :. = -J dF(n) < O = -[1 - F (n ' ) ] .  for n• 11 [0,1] . Evidently N is a
n• 
continuous. strictly decreasing function on [0 ,1] with N(O) = ii.
N(n) = o.  From (2.2) . the aggregate labor supply to the untaxed 
A 
sector is LT(w) = N(nT (w) ) .  so in view of the properties of °r
(namely. that it is strictly_ decreasing on (1  - t(l) . 1  - t(O) ) )  and N. 
A 
LT(w) is oontinuous and strictly increasing on (1  - t (l) ,1 - t(O) ) .
A - A with LT(w) = n for w 2. 1 - t(O) . LT(w) = O for w i 1 - t (l) . Moreover
the labor demand function w-1 is continuous and strictly decreasing on 
Cw<o>.w<ii>J with w-1<w> = ii for w i w<n>. w-1<o> = o for w 2. w(O) .
Since. by hypothesis w(O) > 1 - t (l)  and w<ii> < 1 - t (O) . the excess 
-1 A demand function w - LT has a value of zero at some unique point w0
in the interval. so w0 is the unique equilibrium (see Figure 2 .2) . 
FIGURE 2 .2 ABOUT HERE 
• Let us denote by wT the unique equilibrium under T. If we
• • • • define � e �(wT) .  then 1 - t (�) = wT. and the individual labor
,,. . supply function lT(n;wT) given by 2 .2 is optimal for all n, given T
• and wT. and supports the equilibrium in the sense that
S 
,,. • ,,. • -1 • lT(n;wT)dF(n) = LT(wT) = w (wT) .
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These arguments are readily extended to nondifferentiable 
schedules. Since any admissable schedule has at most a finite number 
of points at which t is discontinuous, the right-hand and left-hand 
derivatives, t+ and t-. exist everywhere. The conditions (2 .la,b) 
remain valid as stated. as is (2.lc) when the inequality w < 1 - t (n )  
is replaced by the inequality w < 1 - t+(n) . In (2.ld) the equality 
A + A - A w = 1 - t(n - l )  is replaced by w a [l - t (n - l ) .  1 - t (n - l ) ] .n n n 
For any w a [1 - t (l) ,1 - t(O) ] there is still a unique ability level 
+ -
�(w) such that w a [1 - t (� (w) ) ,1 - t (�(w) ) ], and � is still a
continuous, increasing function . (If x0 is a point of 
nondifferentiability evidently �(w) = x0 for all 
+ -w a [1 - t Cx0) ,1 - t Cx0) J. so � is no longer strictly increasing on
this interval however. )  Hence the individual labor supply is still 
given by (2.2) and the argument proceeds as before. The resulting 
equilibrium w; and threshhold ability level n; defining the individual
labor supply function are still unique. though now satisfying 
• - • + • 1 - WT a [t (nT ) , t  (�)] .
Things become slightly more complicated when the marginal-rate 
schedule t is not strictly increasing, i.e.  is constant over some 
interval (or "bracket") c1.x1. with 
< k for I < X.
t (X) = k for x s [l, Xl 
> k for I > I
Without loss of generality we can suppose there is only one such 
interval, and that w(O) > k > w(n) . When the wage rate takes on the 
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value w = 1 - k, some of the individual labor supply decisions become 
ambiguous. In particular, if n > X the first-order condition (2.ld ) 
holds for all ln such that In= n - ln a [I.I], since
t (Xn) = k = 1 - w for all such ln• Let lT(n;w) and .L.r<n;w) be
functions which specify the largest and smallest such ln for each n,
i .e .  
ITCn;l - k) = Lr<n ;l - k )  = o for n < !.
ITCn;l - k) = n - I for n l 1. and
0 for n 8 c1.i1 
.L.r<n ;l - k) 
n - I for n > I 
For w � 1 - k the first-order condition (1.1) again holds at a unique 
?'n for each n, so �(w) can be defined as before, and
0 
lT(n;w) = LTCn;w) = n - �(w) 
for n < �(w) 
for n 2 �(w) 
A 
Any lTCn;w) a C.L.rCn;w) , lT(n;w) ] is a possible individual labor supply
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e 
J 
A 
function, so the aggregate labor supply LT = f T(n; w)dF(n) can lie 
anywhere in th e interval £.L.r<w> ,LT(w)J, where t..r<w> = J i.r<�::w)dF(n)
and LT(w) = J fT(n; w)dF(n). Aggregate labor supply is thus described
. -
by a correspondence LT(w) = £.L.r(w),LT(w)J, which is interval-valued at 
w = 1 - k, and single-valued elsewhere. It is readily verified that 
• • 
LT is upper hemi-continuous, so existence of an equilibrium wT follows
from a straightforward fixed-point argument. To show uniqueness, note 
that the endpoint functions .br• LT are increasing on
[1 - t(l),1 - t(O)] , .L.r<w> = LT(w) at all w F 1 - k, and that 
lim t..r<w> = .br(l - k) = N(X) 
w�l-k 
lim LT(w) = LT(l - k) = N(l) 
W�l-k 
-1 • • - • Hence since w ( wT) s £.br<wT),LT(wT)],
- • -1 • • -1 
.1i.r<w> 2. LT(wT) 2. w ( wT) for w > wT' so since w (w) is strictly 
decreasing, clearly w-1( w) < t..r<w>, i.e. w-1 (w) I CL.rCw),�(w)J for
• -1 - • any w > wT. Similiarly, w (w) I £.L.r(w),�(w)J for all w < wT. 
• 
If the unique equilibrium wT does not coino.1.de with a flat, 
(2.2) still holds and all individual labor supplies, incomes and taxes 
e A 
paid are uniquely determined. If wT = 1 - k, however, ln is ambiguous
for n > !. as noted earlier. From individual maximization yT(n) must 
A 
be constant for all optimal 'n' so individual and aggregate post-tax
incomes are uniquely determined. Moreover, since the aggregate labor 
e -1 e J 
A 
supply is fixed at LT= w ( wT) = fndF(n), evidentlyf A 
J 
eA e e 
J "" zT(n)dF(n) = wTlndF(n) = w-r1'T• while XT(n)dF(n)• =f A e 
(n - fn)dF(n) = 1 - LT' so aggregate untaxable and taxable incomes,
and hence total taxes collected, are also uniquely determined. 
However taxes paid or pretax incomes cannot be unambiguously 
determined for those individuals with n > !· 
• 
Since the aggregate labor supply LT must lie in the interval
- . -
C.br<l - k),LT(l - k)] = [N(X),N(!)] there exists a unique � 8 ex.xi
• • 
such that N(nT) = LT' and it is readily verified that the individual
labor supply function 
fcn:l - k)
•
n for n < nT
• •
n - � for n 2. �
is optimal for all n, and supports the equilibrium (since 
J
A e e 
f(n;l - k)dF(n) = N(�) =LT). 
Henceforth we shall assume all individuals act according to 
this particuiar labor supply function: with this convention pre-tax 
incomes and taxes can be uniquely determined for all n, even for 
schedules whose marginal rate is not strictly increasing • 
2 .4 Fµrther Results 
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To summarize the previous section, for any admissable T there 
• 
exists a unique equilibrium wT' and a unique threshold ability level
• • • 
� such that t (nT) = 1 - wT' and 
f Tcn:w;>
•
n for n < �
• •
n - � for n 2. nT
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is an optimal labor supply for all n, and supports the equilibrium. If 
• • w(O) .i 1 - t (l) the equilibrium is wT = w(O) and nT = 1 ;  alternatively
- . - . if w(n) 2 1 - t(O) the equilibrium is at wT = w(n) , and nT = o.
- . Otherwise the equilibrium is an interior one, w(n) < wT < w(O) , with
• 
O < nT < 1. If XT (n) , zT(n) and YT (n) denote the pre-tax taxable,
untaxable and total income of a person of type n, evidently 
XT (n) =
ZT (n) = 
YT (n)
• 
n for n .i nT
• • °T for n > °T 
• 0 for n 
.i 
OT
• • n - °T for n > nT
• 
n for n 
,i 
OT
• • • • °T + wT(n - °T) for n > nT
• using the labor-supply function (2.2) at w = wT. All incomes increase
with n, and total income YT (n) increases strictly with n. Similarly
if we denote by CT(n) = T(XT(n) ) the tax actually collected from n,
and by XT (n) = XT (n) - T(XT (n) ) and yT(n) = XT(n) + ZT(n) = 
YT (n) - CT (n) his post-tax declared (taxable) and total income, then
evidently 
T (n) 
CT (n) • T(°f) 
• for n .i nT
• for n > °T 
and 
YT(n) 
n - T(n) • for n .i °T
• • • • n - T(nT) + WT(n - °T) for n > OT
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Note that yT(n) is a strictly increasing function of n, and that CT is
an increasing function whose marginal rate of increase ( right-hand 
derivative) cT is 
t+(n) a [0 ,1] for n < n; 
cT (n) 0 • for n 2 °T
Notice also that for any tax T the effective schedule CT
• depends only on the shape of T(X) for X ! nT. Thus, if T(X) = T ' (X )
• for all X ! °T• then CT (n) = CT,(n) for all n; ie. the effective
schedules CT and CT , are identical . Moreoever after-tax incomes YT'
yT' are also identical for all n. Hence we shall say the schedules T
and T '  are equivalent. The relationship between T, YT (n) , CT (n) and
yT(n) is shown in Figure 2.3 below.
FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE 
The total revenue collected under the schedule T is 
1 
RT = J CT (n)dF(n) .
0 
""* Note that the labor-supply correspondence LT depends only on
the marginal-rate schedule (t, or t-,t+ for non-differentiable T) . 
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Thus if T and T '  are two tax schedules whose marginal schedules are 
the same--or equivalently, if T '  = T + k is a vertical translation of 
• • T�then LT = LT ' ' so they must yield the same equilibrium wage
• • wT = wT' ' and threshold ability levels � = �·· Hence individual
labor supplies and pre-tax incomes are the same under either schedule . 
Taxes collected and post-tax incomes are not,  however, since 
CT (n) = CT, (n) + k, yT, (n) = yT(n) - k, while the total revenues
collected are RT, = RT + k. Hence, for any T, there exists a unique
feasible schedule T '  = T + k which raises precisely zero net revenue . 
Note that CT (O) > O would imply CT (n) > O for all n, since CT
is an increasing function, which in turn implies RT > o and hence that 
the schedule T is not fe_asible. On the other hand CT (O) i O implies 
T(O) i O and hence, (since ti 1 on (0 ,1) ) that T(X)  i X for all X .  
Thus, for feasible schedules, taxes imposed never exceed pretax 
income. 
. . -Let T be a differentiable schedule such that wT s (w(n) ,w( O) ) ,
• whence � s ( 0 ,1) , and let T '  be another differentiable schedule such 
• • • • that t ' (nT) = t(nT) .  From ( 2 .lc ) , 1 - t (nT) = wT' If we consider
individual labor supply under the schedule T '  and with the wage rate 
• wT, then (2 .lc ,d )  apply (since
• • • wT = 1 - t ' (�) s (1 - t ' ( l) ,1 - t ' ( O) ) ) .  Evidently n < nT implies
• • 1 - t ' (n) L wT = 1 - t (nT) ,  since t is increasing. If the latter is
A 
strict then 10 = 0 , from ( 2 .lc ) . If it holds with equality then 
A A * 
l = o is still optimal, since 1 - t ' (n - l ) = 1 - t ' (n) = wT andn n 
A • • 
( 2 .ld ) holds . On the other hand ln = n - � is optimal for n L nT'
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A • • since 1 - t ' (n - ln> = 1 - t • (nT) = wT. so (2 .ld) again holds . Hence
A • 
there exists an individually optimal labor supply function lT, (n;wT)
A • f A • which yields an aggregate labor supply LT, CwT) = lT, (n;wT) such that
A • • • • 
LT,(wT) = NC�) = LT (wT) .  Since wT is the equilibrium under T,
• A • A • • wT = w(LT(wT) )  = w(LT, (wT) )  so wT is also an equilibrium (which must
• • be unique ) under T ' ,  and � = �·· It is easily seen that these 
conclusions also hold for nondifferentiable schedules T, T' if 
• - • + • • 1 - wT s [t ' (�) ,t '  (nT) ) ,  and the extension to the cases � = O and
• 
� = 1 is obvious . Thus we have: 
Proposition 2.1 If T is a feasible schedule for which 
- . w(n) < wT < w(O) , and if T '  is another feasible schedule such that
• - • + • • • 1 - wT s [t ' (nT) ,t '  (nT) )  (or equivalently t (nT) = t ' (�) if both
• schedules are differentiable at �) then both schedules induce the 
• • • • same equilibrium, i.e .  wT = wT' ' with � = �· · Hence pretax incomes
are the same, i .e .  XT (n) = XT, (n) , zT (n) = zT, (n) and YT (n) = YT, (n) ,
for all n • 
The same conclusions also hold for T '  such that 
• • • • t • (�) i 1 - wT if wT = w(O) and � = 1 ,  or for T ' such that
. . . - . t ' (nT) L 1 - wT if wT = w(n) and � = o • 
3 .  FAIRNESS AND PROGRESSIVITY 
3 .1 Fairness 
We assume that individual welfare depends directly on after-
tax income or consumption. Hence the fairness of any tax schedule T 
can be judged solely in terms of the fairness of the after-tax income 
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distribution it induces, with more egalitarian distributions being 
fairer than less egalitarian ones, ceteris paribus. Rather than work 
with a specific index of income inequality, we instead assume that the 
fairness of an:y income distribution can be assessed in terms of a 
social welfare function of the form 3wCT) = J W(yT(n ) )dF(n ) ;  as
Atkinson (1970) has pointed out, the usual inequality measures can all 
be rationalized by social welfare functions of this kind . We shall 
refer to W as the evaluation function : we assume it to be twice 
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave 
on [0 ,1]. (The second property implies that the welfare of every 
individual, no matter how wealthy, is given some weight, and the third 
implies that income equalization is positively valued by the social 
welfare function . )  If 5w<T') z J W(yT,(n ) ) dF (n )  > 
J W(yT(n) ) dF(n )  = 8i,CT) , the tax schedule T' is conditionally fairer
than T, conditional upon the particular evaluation function W (a  
different function W' might order them differently) . Any admissable W 
induces a (transitive, complete) ordering of the admissable schedules. 
If no admissable T' is conditionally fairer than T (and if T itself is 
admissable) , then the schedule T is optimal for W; as it turns out, in 
. the structure we consider here there exists an optimal schedule for 
each w. and with some weak restrictions on the wage function w. all 
schedules which are optimal for W are equivalent (as defined on p.  
12) . If T' is conditionally fairer than T according to every
evaluation function W, then we shall say T' is unconditionally or 
unambiguously fairer than T.  Evidently the "unambiguously fairer" 
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1 relation is a partial (transitive) ordering of the admissable 
schedules, and is equal to the intersection (over all W) of the 
"conditionally fairer" relations . 
The conditional relationship is the one which would guide a 
single decision maker, such as a benevolent despot or elected 
representative interested in promoting social justice, or a voter who 
judges tax proposals from a social or "sociotropic" point of view. We 
examine the relationship between progressivity and conditional 
fairness in Section 3 .3 below. Proposition 3 .6 shows that any such 
decision maker, given a free choice of tax schedules, will always 
select a linear or flat-rate schedule, rather than a progressive one. 
Alternatively, in a democracy citizens may have their own views on 
what constitutes fairness, and may vote accordingly ( for specific tax 
reform proposals, or for candidates who advocate such proposals) . 
Since different citizens may employ different criteria W, their 
individual orderings of the admissable tax schedules in general will 
differ, so majority rule may well not yield a consistent social 
ordering of tax schedules. In Section 3 .4 we show that (again, under 
the weak restrictions on the wage function w) there nevertheless 
exists a majority equilibrium 9, and this equilibrium schedule is 
linear over [0,nf . This equilibrium, it should be noted, assumes
that voters view tax changes in a purely disinterested and altruistic 
fashion , and judge them solely in terms of whether they lead to a 
fairer post-tax income distribution . They thus view the income 
distribution as a pure public good. in Thurow's (1980) sense, and are 
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not influenced by considerations or their own tax burden. (The other 
extreme, that citizens vote in a self-interested fashion to minimize 
their own tax burden, is considered in part 4 below. )  
It will be useful to first note some useful tacts about the 
nunambiguously tairern relationship. The first two are well known. 
Proposition 3.1 (Pareto) .  If T' and T are two schedules such that 
YT,(n) 2 YT(n) tor all n, with strict inequality tor some (nonnull, 
measurable set of) n, then T' is unambiguously fairer than T. 
Proposition 3 .1 is an immediate consequence or the tact that W 
is a strictly increasing function. 
The second proposition, from Atkinson (1970 , pp . 245-248) , 
says that one income distribution is unambiguously fairer than another 
it it can be obtained from the latter by redistributing income from 
the richer to the poorer. In the present context this assertion can 
be more precisely stated as follows : 
Proposition 3.2 It T' and T are two schedules such that 
J yT,(n)dF(n) = J yT(n)dF(n) , and it there exists an ability level n'
such that yT,(n) 2 yT(n) for n < n'  and yT,(n) i yT(n) for n > n ' ,
with strict inequality holding tor some (nonnull measurable set of) n, 
then T' is unambiguously fairer than T. 
The third proposition says that a tax schedule T' which yields 
lower total income than a schedule T cannot be unambiguously fairer 
than T.  
'Proposition 3.3 If J yT(n)dF(n) > J yT,(n)dF(n) then T' is not
unambiguously fairer than T .  
l£Q.Qf Let T = J yT(n)dF(n) - J yT, (n)dF(n)
J [yT(n) - yT,(n) ] dF(n) > O. Consider the weighting function w6
2 defined by W6 (y) = y - 6y • For any 6 a (0 ,1) , W6 is increasing and
strictly concave on [0 ,1) . Now, 8w (T) - 5w (T ' )  
6 6 
J W6(yT(n) ) dF(n) - J W6(yT,(n ) ) dF(n) = 
J [yT(n) - yT,(n) ] dF(n) + s·J cl{,(n) - l{<n) ] dF(n) = T + 6�. where
� = J cl{,(n) - l{<n) ] dF(n) a [-1 ,1) . If � 2 0 then clearly
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8w (T) - 3w (T ' )  2 o. Otherwise, it � < O ,  choose 6 a (0,1) such that 
6 6 
6 < -<rf�>; then 3w (T) - 8w (T ' )  > T - <rf�>� = o. In either case we 
6 6 
have 5w (T) > 5w (T ' ) .  so T is conditionally fairer than T '  tor w5 and 
Ii 6 
thus T '  is not unambiguously fairer than T.  
Finally, we should note that it T is  equivalent to  T '  then 
YT(n) = YT' (n) tor all n so Sw<T> = Sw<T ' )  tor all W .  Thus anyone
ranking tax schedules by any social welfare function 5w will be 
indifferent between equivalent schedules. 
3 .2 Fairness and the Degree of Progressivity 
QED 
As noted earlier, a schedule T is less progressive than T ' ,  it 
there exists an income level x• such that t ' (X) i t(X) (respectively 
2) for x < x· (respectively >>. with strict inequality (except at x·>
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• on some open interval containing X • Proposition 3 .4 below expresses 
one relationship between fairness and degree of progressivity in this 
sense; it shows that the relationship is a perverse one: 
Proposition 3.4. If T is a feasible, differentiable schedule which is 
progressive over the interval [0,n;] (ie .  t (O) < t (n; ) ) ,  with 
• • O < nT < 1 and O < t (nT) < 1 ,  then there exists a less progressive
schedule T '  which is unambiguously fairer than T.  
Proof Let T be a schedule satisfying the above conditions, and let T '  
be  another differentiable schedule such that t • (n;) = t(n; ) ,  
• • t' (X) > t (X) for X < nT, and t ' (X) < t (I)  for I > nT' as shown on
Figure 3.1 below. Evidently we can always find such a schedule, 
FIGURE 3 .1 ABOUT HERE 
and clearly T '  is less progressive than T.  From Proposition 2.1 , both 
• • • • • schedules induce the same equilibrium, with wT = wT, and °T = °T •' If
• • it were true that T ' (nT) i T (nT) the effective tax rate would satisfy
• • • • • CT , (n) = T ' (°T,) i T (nT) = CT (nT) for n 2 °T = °T •  and
• CT, (n) = T ' (n) < T (n) = CT (n) for n < °T (since t ' (n) > t (n) over this 
range) , implying J CT , (n) dF (n) < J CT (n)dF(n) = O (since n; > 0) and
hence that the total tax collected under T' does not meet the revenue 
target, i.e. T' is not feasible, Thus if T' is feasible (clearly we 
can ensure this by taking a vertical translation of the original 
• • • schedule) it must be true that T ' (nT) > T (°T) ,  implying CT 1 (n) > CT (n)
• 
for all n > nT .
• Moreover, the fact that t ' (n) > t (n) for n < nT and
that J (CT , (n) - �(n) ) dF (n) = O ( from feasibility) imply that there
.  must exist some n' s (O ,°T) such that T' (n) = CT,(n) > CT (n) = T(n)
for n > n ' ,  T' (n) = CT 1 (n) < CT 1 (n) = T(n) for n < n' , with equality
at n = n' . All before-tax incomes are the same under T and T '  ( from 
31 
Proposition 2 .1) , so after-tax incomes under T will be greater for n < 
n' , and lower for n > n '  • Moreover since total after-tax incomes are 
the same (since total taxes collected are the same, from feasibility) , 
Proposition 3,2 applies, and implies that T' is unambiguously fairer 
than T, as asserted, 
The restriction to differentiable schedules is clearly not 
• • essential, and the inequalities on °T and t (nT) are needed only to
QED 
ensure that T' be less progressive than T in the precise sense of the 
earlier definition: without these conditions, we could still find an 
unambiguously fairer schedule T '  such that t • (n) l t+(n) for n < n; 
. - . and t ' (nT) it (n) for n > °T• though unless both equalities were
strict T '  would not be less progressive than T in the sense defined 
earlier . In fact, the following variant of Proposition 3 .4 is readily 
established : 
Proposition 3.5 For any feasible schedule T which is progressive over 
• [O,°T] ,  there exists a feasible flat-rate schedule T '  which is
unambiguously fairer than T. 
Proof • To show this first suppose °T = O .  Then everyone works only in
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the underground econ01117, and yT(n) = w(n)"n for all n. The flat-rate
schedule T ' (X )  = 0 for all X is also feasible, but evidently everyone 
works entirely in the taxable sector under it, so 
yT, (n )  = n > w(n)"n = yT(n) for all n. Hence, from Proposition 3 .1 ,
T '  is unambiguously fairer than T .  
• Otherwise, if °r > O ,  let T ' (X) = Ill + G with 
• - • + • - + II =  1 - wT 1 [t ( °r ) ,t (°r ) ] . Since t and t are increasing, with
+ - • • + • t (I) i t (°r ) if I < °r • it follows that t (X) i II for X < °r•
Moreover the inequality must be strict for some nonnull set of I, else 
• we would have t (O) = II  = t(nT) '  contrary to the hypothesis that T is
• progressive over [0 ,°r] . Hence, from the same reasoning as used to
• establish Proposition 3 .4 ,  there must exist n '  1 ( 0 , °r) such that 
yT, (n )  > yT(n) for n < n' , yT, (n )  < yT(n)  for n > n ' ,  so T '  is
unambiguously fairer than T .  
3 .3 Individual Choice of a Fair Ta:g Schedule 
Proposition 3 .S implies, in particular, that no schedule T 
• which is progressive over [0, °r] can be optimal for any evaluation 
QED 
function W, so that under any such function W the optimal schedule TW
(if one exists) is necessarily a flat-rate schedule over this range. 
It is straightforward to show that such an optimum does in fact exist . 
Proposition 3.6 For any evaluation function W there exists a 
conditionally optimal feasible schedule TW which is linear. The tax
rate llw for any such schedule satisfies 1 - llw 1 [w(n ) ,w( O) ] .
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Proof By Proposition 3 .S ,  if a conditionally optimal tax exists for W 
• then it must be linear on [0, °r] .  Consider any linear (on [0,1] ) 
schedule T defined by T (X) = III + a .  From Section 2 .2 above there is 
• a unique equilibrium wage wT in the untaxed sector, and the average
- - A e pretax income in the taxable sector is then XT = n - LT(wT) . Since T
is feasible, government net revenues are zero, and we have 
J T (XT (n) ) dF(n) = P IT+ a = O ,  or a =  -llXT. Thus ci is determined
-
uniquely as a function of p ,  a(ll) = -px , so there is a one-to-one
correspondence between feasible linear tax schedules and tax rate 
parameters. For T defined by T (X )  = III +  ; (p ) , let 
y(p ,n )  = YT(n)  = ( 1  - ll>XT (n) + zT(n) - :c11> . Then define1 1 
S
W: [0,11 -+ :m by 
S
w<ll> = J W(y (p, n)dF(n) = J W( yT(n)dF(n) = SwCT) .
-
0 0 
3w then is a simple function of one real variable, rather than a
-
functional on tax schedules like 3w· Also, 5w<ll> 2 Sw (ll ' )  if and only
if 5w <T > 2 SW(T ' ) , where T and T '  are feasible linear tax schedules
with tax rates II and II '  respectively . Notice that SW is useful only
for ranking feasible linear schedules. Since F has a continuous 
density, and W and y are integrable functions, continuous in their 
-
arguments, SW is continuous [by Apostol p .  2 81 , Theorem 10 .3 8] • The 
interval [0,1] is compact, so 3w attains its maximum for some
llw 1 [0 ,1] . Then the tax schedule Tw defined by T.wCX) = llwl + a(llw>
is a conditionally optimal schedule for W. 
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Now we show that 1 -llw a [w(n),w(O)J. 
Suppose 1 - llw > w(O). Then, by Section 2 .3 the equilibrium 
• 
wage rate is w(O), and Dr = 1 .  Then Y<llw,n> = ( 1  - llw>n + llwn• Vn. w 
Consider the tax T' defined by T'(X) = ll'X +;(II'), with 
• 
II' = 1 - w(O) > llw· The equilibrium wage is again w(O), and Dr• = 1 ,  
-
so y(ll ',n) = (1 - 11 ')n + 11 'n Vn. Then we have 
- - - - - -
y(ll',n) - Y<llw,n> =<II' - llw><n - n), so 1<11.n> = Y<llw,n>. 
y<11',n> > 7<11w.n> for all n < n, and 1<11·.n> < 7<11w.n> for all n > n. 
Thus, by Proposition 3 .2 , T' is unambiguously fairer than Tw so Tw 
could not be conditionally optimal for W. 
Next, suppose 1 - llw < w(n). Then, again looking at Section 
- . 
2 .3 , we see that the equilibrium wage rate is w(n), and Dr = O. So, 
- -
w 
Y<llw,n> = w(n)n Vn. But, 1f we consider T' defined by T'(X) = O 
• 
VI. then the equilibrium wage rate is w(O) and Dr• = 1, so 
y(ll ',n) = n Vn. Then y(ll ',n) > Y<llw,n> Vn, so by Proposition 3 .1 
T' is unambiguously fairer than Tw• and thus Tw could not be 
conditionally optimal for w. Hence 1 - llw a [w(n),w(O)J.
QED 
Of course, because 8.117 schedule T' equivalent to TW is also
optimal for W, the set of optimal taxes is infinite. However, the 
following proposition estableishes that under some weak conditions on 
the wage function w, the optimal linear schedule is unique. Thus all 
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optimal schedules are equivalent, so they all induce the same 
effective schedule • 
2 2 [:9li.{11] 2
Proposition 3,7 If the wage function w satisfies�> - dL 
dL2 1 - w(L) 
for every L a [O,n] then for any evaluation function W the function SW 
is strictly concave. Hence the optimal linear schedule TW is unique,
and any (possibly nonlinear) optimal schedule T'w is equivalent to Tw· 
Moreover, voter preferences over the set of linear schedules are 
single-peaked, 1f every voter i judges schedules according to some 
social welfare function S •wi 
Proof Recall that SW' introduced in the previous proposition, is
defined by Sw(ll) = J WCy(n,ll))dF(n), Consider all linear taxes with
tax rate II satisfying 1 - II a [w(n,w(O)]. If SW is defined by1 
Sw<ll> = Jw<y(ll,n))dF(n) is concave over this set of 11. then SwCT) has
0 
a unique maximum 'fw among such taxes, and hence, 
and 3 .6 ,  8.117 optimal schedule must coincide with 
by Propositions 3 .5 
• 'fw on co.Dr J andw 
thus is equivalent to Tw• Single-peakedness follows directly 1f 8w is 
concave for every W�simply order the linear taxes on the real line by 
their tax rate parameter. 
Since W is concave, SW will be concave if y is concave in II
for each n. We now show this. 
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It is clear from Section 2 .3 that for T defined by 
T (X) = PX - a(p ) .  the equilibrium wage rate in the untaxed sector must 
be wT = 1 - p •  Then y(p ,n )  = ( 1  - P >n + pxT =
(1  - p ) n  + p cii - w-1( 1  - P > > . Since w-1 is twice differentiable, y is
also, and we have 
- - -1 dw-1<1 - 8) ff = -n + (n - w ( 1  - p ) )  + p �-- • and
� _ dw-1<1 - 8) _ pd
2w-1Cl - 8) 
ap2 
- dw dw2 • 
By definition , w(w-1 (1  - p ) )  = 1 - p. so
hence 
so 
-1 
_ dw.J:IH...:. = -1. dL dw or
-1 .dH...:. = [Qw]-1 · dw LiL • 
_ d2w .mL: = f �J2 .d2w-1 • 
dL2 dw l dw j dw2 
or d
2w-1 
= - �. rll!]-3 . dw2 dL2 Ln. 
£:z = 2 ciw<w (1 - B l )  + pd w(w (1 - 8 ) )  ciw<w
-1<1 - 8)) 2- [ -1 !-2 2 -1 [ !
3 
�2 dL Af 2 dL 
This is negative at all p if 
2 _ 2
[ciw<w-1Cl - B)) 12 
d w(w 1c1 8)) dL j 
dL2 
> ���-�p �
--=� for all p s [1 - w(0) ,1 - w(n) ] ,
Letting L = w-1 c 1 - p ) , this condition can be written
� 2
J!H.1.l
2 
> dL 
dL 1 - w(L) 
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for all L s  co.ii1 .
QED 
3 .4 Fair Taxation Under Majority Rule 
In view of Propositions 3 .5 . 3 .6 and 3 .7 above. we can easily
extend the analysis from the individual case to group decision-making 
under majority rule. A Define a majority equilibrium T as a tax 
schedule which no other schedule can defeat in a pairwise majority 
vote, If voters have different weighting functions Wi their
preferences over tax schedules will be different, so the possibility 
of voting cycles arises and a majority equilibrium may not exist . 
Proposition 3 • 7. along with the well known result on single-peakedness
and majority rule (Black (1958) ) ,  implies that majority votes over 
linear schedules will be consistent (i .e .  different pairwise votes 
A will be transitive) . and that at least one such schedule T will 
satisfy the median voter condition and be able to defeat any other 
A 
such schedule in a pairwise vote, However T is only a restricted 
equilibrium, within the set of linear schedules; Proposition 3 .6 does
not preclude the possibility that some progressive schedule T '  could 
defeat �. and hence that there is no majority equilibrium within the 
set of admissable schedules, However Proposition 3 .5 . in conjunction
A with 3 .6 . does preclude this possibility. and implies that T is a 
general equilibrium: 
Proposition 3.8  Under the condition of Proposition 3 .7. there exists 
a majority equilibrium, i.e .  a feasible schedule t which cannot be 
defeated by any other feasible schedule in a pairwise majority vote. 
\ 
Moreover every such equilibrium is linear over the interval �o. n:] .
T 
Proof We must prove that no non-linear ( i.e. progressive) schedule 
A 
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can defeat the majority-preferred flat-rate schedule T. If, there were 
A 
such a schedule T' which defeats T, then the set or voters C who 
prefer T' to T constitute a majority. From Proposition 3 .S ,  there 
exists a flat-rate schedule T'' which is unambiguously fairer than T' ,  
so every i a C prefers T'' to T' ,  and hence ( from the transitivity or 
A 
individual preference) also prefers T'' to T. But this means that the
A 
flat-rate schedule T'' defeats T in a pairwise vote, which is 
A A 
impossible. Hence no such T' can defeat T, i.e. T is an equilibrium
against all admissable, feasible schedules. The fact that every such 
A • T must be linear over [O,�] follows directly from Proposition 3 .S .
QED 
As a fiilal. observation, we note that all majority equilibria 
are equivalent it the distribution or voters has strictly positive 
density at the median. 
4 .  SELF-INTEREST AND PROGRESSIVITY 
4.1 A Preliminary Result 
We now consider the problem from the viewpoint or citizen-
taxpayers interested in promoting their own welfare, narrowly 
interpreted, rather than pursuing broader social ends or fairness or 
economic equality. Individual welfare, in this context, is again 
measured by after-tax consumption; thus an individual or ability n 
will prefer one schedule T to another, T' ,  it and only it 
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YT(n) > yT, (n). In general citizens at differing earning abilities 
will have differing preferences over such schedules, and in particular 
may view more and less progressive schedules differently. A 
preliminary result which gives some insight into this relationship is 
as follows (nm denotes the median ability level; the differentiability
assumption is unnecessary, and the result could easily be strengthened 
in various ways): 
Proposition 4.1 If T is a differentiable schedule such that 
• O < t (nT) < 1, then there exists a more progressi�e schedule T' which
is favored by upper-income and opposed by lower-income taxpayers. If 
O < t (Dai) < 1 ,  we can find such a schedule T' which is preferred by a 
majority, consisting or middle- and upper-income citizens. 
Proof Let (X.,X) be the interval over which t(X) a (0,1) for all 
- . -
I a <X. X); then by hypothesis Dai• Dr a <x.x> so there exist points 
• n' a (X, nm) R (l.,Dr) . Let T' be a differentiable schedule which
crosses T at some such n' , i.e. T'(n') = T(n'), with T' (X) > T (X) for 
I < n'. T' (X) < T(X) for I > n', and whose marginal-rate schedule t 
• • • satisfies t'(Dr) = t(Dr)• t'( X) < t (X) for X a (�·Dr) , and 
· -
t'(X) > t (X) for I a (Dr,x), with t'( X) = t(X) elsewhere. Such a 
schedule is shown in Figure 3 .1 . Evidently we can always find such a 
• 
schedule, and can make it lie as close to T on the interval [n' ,Dr] as 
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desired. Clearly T' is more progressive than T {relative to the point 
. - . . 
°T and interval {!,I) ) .  Since t • (nT) = t {nT) ,  both schedules have the
same equilibrium and induce the same before-tax incomes, i.e.  
YT , {n) = YT {n) for all n, from Proposition 2 .1 . Evidently
CT , {n) = T ' {n) > T {n) = CT{n) for n < n ' ,  while CT 1 {n) < CT{n) for n >
n ' ,  so by choosing T '  to lie sufficiently close to T over the interval 
• {n ' ,°T) we can ensure that 
n '  1 
f [CT 1 {n) - CT {n) ] dF{n) + f [CT 1 {n) - CT {n) ] dF {n)
0 n '  
1 
f [CT , {n) - CT{n) ] dF{n) = O ,  and hence that T '  is feasible. 
0 
Since 
before-tax incomes are the same under either schedule, clearly 
taxpayers with n < n '  will prefer the less progressive schedule T, 
while those with n > n' prefer T ' ;  moreover since n' < nm this latter
set constitutues a majority, which consists of upper- and middle-
income {or -ability) taxpayers. 
QED 
Thus an increase in progressivity may well redistribute 
incomes upwards, and hence {from Proposition 3 .2) lead to an 
unambiguously less fair income distribution; nevertheless, if the more 
progressive schedule T '  is properly chosen, it may be preferred by a 
majority of taxpayers, and thus prevail over the fairer schedule T .  
{This does not imply that every more-progressive schedule 
redistributes incomes in this way, of course, or that every less-fair 
schedule is necessarily more progresive. ) 
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4.2 Individual Choice of a Tax Schedule 
Let us now consider the choice of a tax schedule from the 
viewpoint of a simple taxpayer interested in minimizing his own tax 
burden, or more accurately, maximizing his own after-tax income. We 
shall say a feasible schedule � is optimal for °o if it maximizes the 
after-tax_ income yT{n0) of an individual of ability n0 over the set of
feasible schedules T, i .e.  if Y,.<n0) 2 yT{n0) for all such T.T 
Heuristically, an optimal schedule is one which shifts as much as 
possible of the tax burden to other taxpayers; since {from 
feasibility) the total revenue is constant, this will minimize his own 
burden, and ceteris paribus maximize his after-tax income. A schedule 
such as T in Figure 4.1  
FIGURE 4 .1 ABOUT HERE 
is clearly not optimal, since T '  collects more revenue from 
{n : n < n0J and {n : n > n0} ; hence {assuming T feasible) there will be 
a downward translation of T' which is also feasible, and which reduces 
n0 •s  tax and hence increases his after-tax income. A schedule like T '  
{if feasible) might or might not be optimal for n0 : since any
admissable schedule must be an increasing function, clearly no such 
schedule could impose still higher taxes on lower incomes without at 
the same time increasing n0 •s own tax. On the other hand it might or
might not be possible to increase the burden on {n : n > n0} .  A higher 
tax on such incomes will increase the taxes collected from 
• • {n : n s {n0 ,°T) } ,  but will also shift °T to the left and may therefore
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collect more or less from upper-income taxpayers; if T' is optimal, 
evidently it must maximize the revenue collected from {n: n 2 n0} .  A
formal characterization of the optimal schedules is as follows : 
Proposition 4.2 For any n0 , there exists an optimal schedule of the 
form 
TO(X) 
"o 
"o + Po<x - no> 
for X i n0 
for x > no 
where p0 maximizes the revenue collected from {n: n 2. n0J over all 
schedules of this form, and where a0 is chosen to ensure feasibility. 
A 0Moreover any optimal schedule T must be equivalent to such a T • 
Proof We first show that a feasible schedule of the form TO exists. 
Let a and n0 be fixed, and for any p e [0 ,1) denote by TP the schedule
of the form 
a for n i n0 
Tp <x> = a + p cx - n0) for n > n0
• • Let n CP >  = � . If p i 1 - w(O) everyone works completely in the
p
taxable sector, so n• (p ) = 1 .  Alternatively, no matter how large p
becomes, all n i n0 will continue to work in the taxable sector, 
though if p 2. 1 - w(N(n0) )  individuals with n > n0 will work only n0 
units in the taxable sector, and (n - n0) in the untaxed sector, so 
the total labor supply to the untaxed sector will be NCn0) ;  hence 
• n CP >  = n0 for p 2. 1 - w(N(n0) ) .  For p s (1 - w( 0) ,1 - w(N(n0) ) )
• • evidently n (p) s Cn0 ,1) , where from equilibrium 1 - p = w(N(n (p ) ) ) .
Since w is continuous and strictly decreasing on [0,n] ,  and N is 
continuous and strictly decreasing on [0,1) , it follows that 
n• (p) = N-1cw-1c1  - p ) )  is a continuous (in fact differentiable)
strictly decreasing function on [0 ,1) . 
The tax collected from an individual of type n is 
(1 
for n i n0 
CT Cn> = a + p en - n0>p 
• 
for n e Cn0 ,n  CP > >  
• 
(1 + p en (p) - no> for n 2. n
• (p)
so the total revenue collected is 
1 
RT • J CT (n)dF (n)p 0 p 
1 
• 
n CP >
= J adF(n) + J 
0 no 
1 
p en - n0) dF (n) + 
1 
1 
J 
• 
n (p) 
• 
• 
p en <P >  - n0) dF (n)
= a + J p (n - n0) dF (n) - J p en - n (p ) ) dF (n)
no n• (p)
• = a +  p [N(n0) - N(n Cp) ) ] ,  
and maximizing the revenue raised from n 2 n0 is (for fixed a) 
• equivalent to maximizing the quantity p [N(n0) - N(n (p ) ) ] . Let g be 
• defined by g(p) = p [N(n0) - N(n (p ) ) ] . Evidently g is a continuous 
bounded function on [0 ,1) , so it has a maximum, which is clearly 
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• strictly positive. For p 2. 1 - w(NCn0) ) ,  n (p ) = n0 , so g(p)  = O ,  and
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thus the maximizing value p0 cannot lie in this range . Moreover for 
• 
P i  1 - w(O) , n (p) = 1 so g(p)  = P "NCn0) which is strictly increasing 
• in p .  while if p > 1 - w(O) , n (p ) < 1 and g(p )  > [1 - w(O) ]N(n0) 
f( l - w(O) ) .  Hence the maximum must lie in the interval 
• ( 1  - w( 0) ,1 - wCNCn0> > > . and n cp0) s Cn0 .1) . Clearly we can choose
a0 to ensure feasibility. 
Hence a feasible schedule To of the indicated form exists.  It
will be optimal for n0 if and only if there is no other feasible 
schedule T' such that yT , Cn0> < y 0Cn0> .T 
Since Y 0cn0) = n0 2 YT , Cn0)T 
for any such T ' .  clearly the above inequality can hold only if 
cT , <no> < c o <no> ·T 
Let T '  be any feasible schedule such that 
CT , Cn0) i C 0Cn0) = a0 • We will show that the inequality cannot be T 
strict, so To is optimal, and that T '  coincides with a piecewise
linear optimal schedule T ' '  (possibly distinct from To) of the
• indicated form over the interval [0 ,n 01 .  which (since T '  is optimal)T 
proves the result. 
• 
Since CT , (n) is nondecreasing for n < nT ' ' and is constant for
. . . 
n 2 nT , , �· i n0 would imply CT , (n) i a0 for all n. But since
c o<n> = ao for n i no and c o<n> > ao for n > no · this would implyT T 
J CT , (n)dF (n) < J C 0Cn)dF (n) = 0 , so T '  would not be feasible.T 
• contrary to hypothesis. Hence it must be true that � · > n0 • Also, 
since CT ,
n i n0 , so 
is nondecreasing, CT , (n) i CT , Cn0) i a0 = C 0Cn) for allT no no 
f CT , (n)dF (n) i J C 0Cn)dF (n) . Moreover this inequality
0 0 T 
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0 would be strict if CT , (n0) < a0 • i .e .  if T is not optimal • 
Now consider the portion of T '  over Cn0 ,11 . Define T ' ' as the 
piecewise linear schedule 
T '  ' (x) 
where p ' '  
T • Cn0> 
T' (no> + P " (X - no> 
for x i no 
for x > no 
• 
T ' (� , )  - T' Cn0> 
• implying T ' ' Cn0) = T ' Cn0) .  and
�· - no 
. . . T " (nT , )  = T' (� , ) .  Since t '  is defined and continuous almostx 
everywhere on [0 ,1] , T' (X) = T ' (n0) + J t ' (z )dz for any X > n0 , and
thus T ' (X) - T " (X) 
x no 
J [t ' ( z) - t " ( z) ] dz 
no 
x
J ct • (z) - P "ldz .  If
no 
+ + t '  - Cn0) > p ' '  then since t '  (n) > t '  Cn0> for all n > n0 (such that 
• • t ' (n) exists) we would have T ' (� , )  > T ' ' (nT , ) .  which is impossible.
+ - • Similarly t • Cn0) < P "  would imply t •  (nT , )  > P "  and T ' (X) < T " (X)
. - . for all X < nT ' " In this case, since 1 - P ' '  > 1 - t '  (� , )
• • • 
2 w(N(nT , ) ) , evidently �· ·  > nT , , so CT 1 (n) < CT , , (n) for all1 1 1 
n > n0 • and thus J CT , , (n)dF (n) > J CT , (n)dF(n) 2 J C 0 Cn)dF(n) • T no no no 
But T ' ' is a vertical translation downward (since T ' Cn0) i a0) of some 
schedule which is of the same form as TsupO . By construction TO 
maximizes total taxes collected from the set of individuals with n 2n0 1 1 
among taxes of this form. so I c o(n)dF (n) 2 J cT , , (n)dF (n) , so theT no no 
+ inequality above cannot hold, a contradiction. Hence t' Cn0) = P ' ' ,
from which it follows that t ' (X) = P "  and hence T ' (X) = T" (X) for 
• • • 
all X a [n0 ,ri.r1 ·  This implies that �· ·  = � · and hence that 1 
CT , , (n) = � , (n) for all n 2. n0 , whence J CT , (n)dF (n) =
1 1 no 
J CT , , (n)dF (n) i J C 0Cn)dF (n) .T no no 
no no 
This and the fact that J CT , (n)dF (n) i J C 0Cn)dF (n)
1 T 1 
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(established in the previous paragraph) imply, 
1 
from feasibility, that 
both inequalities must be equalities, i. e. 
1 1 no 
J 
no 
c 0 Cn)dF (n)T 
no 
J CT , , (n)dF (n)
no 
J CT , (n)dF (n) and J 
no 0 
C 0Cn)dF (n) T 
J CT , (n)dF (n) .
0 
As noted earlier if CT , (n0) < a0 the second equality could not hold•
0 hence CT , cn0) = a0 for any such T ' ,  so T is optimal for n0 •
This last equality implies T '  is also optimal . Since 
no 
CT , (n) = T ' (n) is increasing for n .i n0 J C 0 Cn)dF (n)T no 0 
J CT , (n)dF (n) implies T ' (n) = CT , (n) = a0 for n .i n0 • Hence T '
0 • 0 coincides with T' ' over [O,�,,] . Since CT ' ' = a  = C 0 for n .i n0
1 1 T 
and J CT , , (n)dF (n) = J C 0 (n)dF (n) it follows that T ' ' is aT no no 
feasible, optimal schedule of the indicated form, which proves the 
result. 
QED ' 
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The individually optimal schedule is thus a sharply 
progressive one , which imposes a marginal tax rate of zero on incomes 
below n0 , and a positive and sizeable rate p0 on incomes greater than 
• n0 , Since C 0(n) is unaffected by the t (X) for X 2. n O' the shape ofT T 
the tax schedule for high incomes is irrelevant for n0 (or 
• {n: n 2. n 0J ) ;  for appearance 's sake all might well agree to imposeT 
sharply increasing marginal rates on such income levels, but these 
rates would never become effective. Increasing marginal rates over 
• the range Cn0 ,n  0> would reduce the tax collected from upper-incomeT 
taxpayers, however, so from n0 •s  point of view the optimal schedule 
should be linear over this range. 
Individuals of a given (potential) income level n0 will prefer 
a schedule whose kink is located at this income level. Thus if 
lower-income taxpayers can control the choice, the kink will be 
located far to the left, and the schedule will resemble a linear or 
flat-rate schedule over most of its range . Conversely, upper-income 
taxpayers would choose a schedule which is essentially a constant or 
per-capita tax for most of the population. If the political process 
is controlled by middle-income citizens, however, the resulting 
schedule will be a sharply progressive one, in which major segments of 
the population confront quite different marginal rates. Progressive 
income taxation of this kind is an effective means for the middle 
class to minimize their own tax burden, at the expense of lower- and 
upper-class taxpayers. Proposition 4 .1 and the results of the 
previous section strongly suggest that the observed social preference 
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for progressive income taxation has much more to do with individual 
self-interest and the desire to maximize personal welfare, rather than 
any attempt to promote social justice . 
4 .3 Self-Interested Voting 
We now consider the question of majority voting over 
alternative tax schedules. The following preliminary result will be 
useful . 
Comment 4 .1 Under the condition of Proposition 3 .6 ,  there exists a 
unique TO for each n0 • The parameters a0 ,
da0 differentiable functions of n0 , with dii"""" > 0 
Po are continuously 
� O and d < O .no 
Proof As noted in the proof of Proposition 4 .2 . pO is a maximum of
• g(p ) = P CNCn0) - N(n (p ) ] , and lies in the interval 
(1  - w(0) ,1 - w(N(n0) ) )  in which g is continuously differentiable.
• • • •  Differentiating we get g ' ( P ) = [N(n0) - N(n (p ) ) ]  - PN ' (n CP > > n  ( p )  
• • [NCn0) - N(n (p ) ) ]  + P/w' (N(n CP> > > .  where the fact that 
N ' (n* <P > > n* ' cp )  = -1/w' (N(n* (p ) ) )  follows from differentiating the
equilibrium condition w(N(n* (p) ) )  - 1 + p = o . Differentiating again
we get 
g " CP >  = -N ' <n* cp»n* ' cp > + Cw' CN<n* cp » > 1-1
-p [w' CN<n* (p) ) ) ] -2w• • (N(n* Cp ) ) ) N ' C n* <p >n* ' cp >
= 2 (w' ) -l + Pw '  '/ Cw• ) 3
= [2w'2 + pw • ' ]  /Cw• ) 3 •
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The condition of Proposition 3 .7 implies that the quantity in square 
brackets is positive, and since w '  is negative it follows that 
g ' ' (P ) < O for all p a  (1 - w(0) ,1 - w(NCn0) ) ] ,  and hence that there 
exists a unique maximum p0 in this interval . From the first-order 
condition g ' CP >  = O it follows that 
• • 
P0 = -w' CN(n <P0> > 1NCn0> - N(n CP0> > 1 .
Hence, differentiating with respect to n0 , we have 
dPo d • • dii"""" = dil"C-w' (N(n CP0> > > CNCn0> - N(n CP0> > 1 10 0 
[ 
• • , dP0] = -w' N' (n ) - N ' (n CP ) )n CP )-0 o o dn0 
. . . . � -CNCn0) - N(n CP0» ]w" "N '  Cn <P0> n <P0> dno
...!.. dPo • , , dPn 
= -w'N ' (n ) - w• · - + [N(n ) - N(n (p ) ) ] l!L.. --!>!. o w' dn0 o o w '  dn0
= -w'N' Cn ) - 1 + -0-- --2., [ 
p w' '] dp 
o (w ' ) 2 dn0 
whence 
d" -w•3N , <no>�o < o . dno 
= 
[2w'2 + Pow' ' ]
since w •  and N '  are  negative, and since the condition of Proposition 
3 .7 implies that [2w•2 + p0w• • ]  i s  positive. Since the total tax
collected under any schedule To is R 0 = a0 + p0CNCn0> - N(n
* Cp ) ) ] ,
T 
. . feasibility requires a0 = -p0[N(n0) - N(n Cp ) ) ] ,  so
da0 ( 
• • • dp0] 
dno 
= -Po N ' Cno> - N' (n <Po> >n <Po> dno 
• dPo -[N(n0) - N(n <P0> 1 dn0
= -PoN '  <no> - p < 1/w ' )
� + f 
PoldPo 
o dno l�·1c1n 
-
0 
-PoN'  <no> > o .
since p0 > o and N ' Cn0> < o .
so 
QED 
Denote by & the set of individually optimal schedules To for
some n0 , and by Tm the optimal schedule of the median (ability level)
voter . Then: 
Proposition 4.3 Under the condition of Proposition 3 .7 ,  all 
taxpayer ' s  preferences are single-peaked on &. and the median schedule 
Tm is a majority equilibrium within this set .
A 
Proof Denote by y0(n0) the after-tax income of an individual with 
ability n. under the schedule TO which is optimal for n0 • We shall
show that 
A 
dyn(no> 
dno 
< 0 
> 0 
for n < n0 
for n > n0 , 
which implies n 's  preferences are single-peaked over &. with (from 
Propositions 4 .2 and 4 .3 )  his most-preferred schedule at n0 = n. 
For n � n0 , under the schedule T0 evidently Y0 = n, 
dy0 da0 C
T0
Cn) = a0 and y0 = n - a0 • so dnO = 
- dnO 
> o . from Comment 4 .1 .
51 
• 
For n a Cn0 .n  01 .  Y0 = n > n0 • so C 0Cn) = a0 + p0Cn - n0> andT T 
• y0 = n - a0 - p0Cn - n0> .  while if n > nT0 
then
. . . . ' . . 
Y = n 0 + w 0 cn - n 0> = n 0 + (1  - Po> <n - n 0> = n - p0cn - n 0 > . n T T T T T T 
• 
C 0Cn> = a0 + p0Cn 0 - n0> .  so y0 = n - a0 - p0Cn - n0> .  so thisT T 
relation holds for all n > n0 • Differentiating with respect to n0 we 
have 
dy da0 � __s = - - + p - (n - no> d c1n0 c1n0 o n0 
� = PoN ' <no> + Po - Cn - no> dno
dp0
= [1 + N ' Cn0> 1 P0 - (n -
0o> dn0
dp0 Since dno 
< O from Comment 4.1 .  and p0 > O and n > n0 • the expression
will be positive if [1 + N ' (n0) ]  2 o . Recall that
N ' (n0) = - [l - F (n0) ] ,  so 1 + N ' (n0) = F (n0) > 0 for all n0 > O .
QED 
The schedule Tm is only an equilibrium within the restricted
subset of & of schedules . Unlike Proposition 3 .7 .  the above result 
cannot be extended to show that Tm is a majority equilibrium within
the entire set of admissable schedules; in general no such equilibrium 
will exist in the purely self-interested, redistributive situation 
being considered here. 
Proposition 4 .3 is nevertheless suggestive as to the likely 
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outcome under pure self-interested voting over the set of individually 
optimal schedules; the equilibrium schedule is the one which is 
optimal for the median-ability, i .e .  middle-income voter, and is a 
sharply progressive one , as noted earlier . The result can also be 
given an alternative interpretation in a delegation or representative 
democracy framework: in most democracies citizens normally cannot 
vote directly on alternative tax schedules; rather, they vote for 
representatives, and delegate the various decisions of government, 
including those on taxation, to these elected delegates. 
Representatives of varying backgrounds will have differing attitudes 
toward taxation and redistribution, and their views may well reflect 
the preferences or interests of their own "class" (i .e. in the context 
of our simple model, those of similar ability levels) .  To the extent 
this is so, and that such distributional issues are important 
electoral considerations, the equilibrium outcome will be election of 
a median-ability representative, whose own inclinations on taxation 
issues will tend toward the kind of progressive taxation which favors 
the middle class. 
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MarginaL Tax Rate for Taxpayers at 
Tenth Ninetieth 
Percentile :  Median: Percentile : 
U .K. .34 .34 .34 
Australia .335 .335 .335 
Austria .28 .28 .33 
Germany .22 
• .22 .3 8 
Denmark .144 .144 .288 
Italy .10 .13 .22 
Canada .18 .21 .28 
Netherlands .20 .25 .39 
U .S.  .16 .22 .3 6 
France .15 .20 .40 
Norway .06 .16 .33 
Sweden .02 .19 .31 
Ireland .20 .35 .45 
Belgium .21 .37 .44 
Table 1 .  Marginal Tax Rates Applicable to Taxpayers at Selected 
Positions in the Before-Tax Income Distribution, Various Countries 
Source : Income Tax Schedules. Distribution of Taxpayers and 
Revenues . OECD , Paris. 1981 . Data from Table 2 , 
p .  19, except as noted . 
• 
Taken from country graph on page 28 .  
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